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 I have been researching crime on public transport systems around the world for 
over 15 years, and when Transport for London (TfL) contacted me to assist them in 
tackling pick-pocketing on the London Underground I realised they faced a new 
challenge. Recently the use of foot patrols targeting crime hot spots have proven to 
be an effective crime reduction measure, for example in Manchester, and, further 
afield in Philadelphia. However, there are a number of problems with introducing 
this approach to dynamic and transient systems such as the London Underground 
which have a continual movement of passengers and infrastructure, and therefore 
the hot-spots tend to move fairly rapidly. 
 Operation Beck (2012) demonstrated the use of hot-spot policing as an effective 
crime reduction tool on the underground, yet incidents of pick-pocketing were 
removed from this analysis. Whilst crime on the underground is low, with less than 
10 crimes per million passengers, almost half of the crime recorded on the 
underground is pick-pocketing. The problem is that by its very nature the precise 
location of pick-pocketing is often unknown; usually it is only discovered by the 
victim post offence and somewhere else on the network. Identifying the hot spots 
of pick-pocketing is therefore highly challenging. Indeed the conventional end of 
line recording used by British Transport Police (BTP) places the offence at the last 
station of a passenger’s journey, which, clearly, is not appropriate for hot-spot 
policing and targeted enforcement. 
Through an adaptation of a technique called aoristic analysis, used to better 
estimate the time of a burglary (sometime between a victim leaving their property 
and returning home), a new algorithm termed Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA) 
was developed in collaboration with BTP and TfL to calculate the probability of 
where theft is most likely to occur based on all victim’s journeys on the 
underground. In addition to helping target resources more effectively, this tool 
identified that ‘above’ ground pick-pocketing, in the vicinity of underground 
stations, and ‘below’ ground pick-pocketing within the underground, tended to 
coincide at the same times and locations, especially at peak travel times. This 
suggests that offenders who operate below ground may also operate above ground 
on major transit systems.  
Further research has also identified particular characteristics of station design and 
features of the nearby environment which also influence the risk of pick-pocketing. 
Risk was increased by factors associated with higher levels of congestion within 
stations including lifts, waiting rooms and fewer platforms; and greater levels of 
accessibility close to stations, more paths and roads. The risk was reduced by 
factors such as those likely to encourage detection and guardianship; stations with 
more personal validators, staff levels and shop rentals; and the presence of more 
domestic buildings nearby. Station type was also important; those that were 
‘attractors’ of crime (which had both high counts of pick-pocketing, and high rates 
of pick-pocketing per million passengers at the station) and those frequently used 
by tourists were at greater risk. The most important feature of this analysis is that 
these factors should not be viewed in isolation, and it is the combination of the 
above factors that increases or reduces risk, both within and near to stations. 
As a result of this research a number of policy recommendations have been 
generated, for policing and the design and management of stations.  The elevated 
risk both inside and near stations at peak travel times highlights the clear 
importance of shared intelligence and joint operations between the Metropolitan 
Police Force and BTP.  Careful management and design of stations alone is not 
likely to be sufficient in deterring offenders without consideration of the design 
and management of the external environment, and the risk factors present in and 
around stations. Whilst much of the attention here is on how to increase the risk for 
offenders, passengers should also be made aware of behaviour that may make them 
more susceptible to victimisation, particularly when tired, easily distracted and in 
congested situations.  The traditional “pick-pockets may be in operation at this 
station” sign may not be the most appropriate; anecdotal evidence suggests 
offenders may simply situate themselves close to these warning signs, and, by 
passengers patting their pockets, an offender implicitly knows which pocket they 
keep their wallet in.    
Targeted policing needs to be both time and locations specific based on the 
available intelligence, although further research should explore the effectiveness of 
visible versus non-uniform (DIP) plain clothed officers. Additionally, the increased 
use of smart phones and new technologies on transport systems such as the London 
Underground may impact the patterns and manifestations of pick-pocketing 
offences. A final challenge for me is in translating these research findings into 
policy.  Indeed, I recently presented the findings of the research to the House of 
Commons Select Committee inquiry into ‘Security on the Railway’. The ICA is 
now available as an automated tool which BTP officers can use to identify high 
risk locations and times on their Force Performance and Mapping Portal. Only time 
will tell as to the extent to which the research will be used in practice.  
 
 
